Logics of Intuitionistic Kripke-Platek Set Theory by Iemhoff, Rosalie & Passmann, Robert
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
05
45
0v
1 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  1
0 J
ul 
20
20
Logics of Intuitionistic Kripke-Platek Set Theory
Rosalie Iemhoffa,1, Robert Passmannb,2,∗
aDepartment of Philosophy, Utrecht University, Janskerkhof 13, 3512 BL Utrecht, The
Netherlands
bInstitute for Logic, Language and Computation, Faculty of Science, University of
Amsterdam, P.O. Box 94242, 1090 GE Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract
We investigate the logical structure of intuitionistic Kripke-Platek set theory
IKP, and show that the first-order logic of IKP is intuitionistic first-order logic
IQC.
1. Introduction
The definition of any formal system has two crucial steps: First, choosing a
logic, and second, adding some axioms for mathematical content. For example,
Peano Arithmetic PA is defined by some arithmetical axioms on the basis of
classical first-order logic. Heyting Arithmetic HA uses the same arithmetical
axioms but is based on intuitionistic first-order logic. Similar situations arise
in the context of set theories: Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory ZF is based on
classical logic while its intuitionistic and constructive counterparts, IZF and
CZF, are based on intuitionistic logic.
A feature of non-classical systems is that their logical strength can increase
with adding mathematical axioms. For example, Diaconescu [8] proved that
adding the Axiom of Choice AC implies the Law of Excluded Middle in the
context of intuitionistic IZF set theory. In other words, the system IZF + AC
is defined on the basis of intuitionistic logic but its logic is classical. This
illustrates the importance of determining the logic of any non-classical system of
interest: By showing that an intuitionistic system indeed has intuitionistic logic,
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one verifies the conceptual requirement that the theory should be intuitionistic.
The first result in this area was of de Jongh [5, 6] who showed that the logic
of Heyting Arithmetic HA is intuitionistic logic. This fact is now known as De
Jongh’s Theorem (see Definition 33 for more details).
Even though there is a rich literature on constructive set theories, there has
not been much focus on the logics of these theories: Passmann [25] recently
proved that the propositional logic of IZF is intuitionistic propositional logic
IPC. On the other hand, a result of H. Friedman and Ščedrov [10] (see Theo-
rem 34) implies that the first-order logic of intuitionistic set theories including
full separation, such as IZF, must be strictly stronger than intuitionistic first-
order logic IQC. These results show that IZF is logically well-behaved on the
propositional level but less so on the level of predicate logic.
What about other constructive set theories? Determining the first-order
logic of CZF, one of the most studied constructive set theories, is still an open
problem. Another natural constructive set theory, that has been studied in the
literature, is intuitionistic Kripke-Platek set theory IKP, which was introduced
by Lubarsky [18] to investigate intuitionistic admissibility theory in the tradition
of Barwise [3]. In this article, we show that IKP is a logically very well-behaved
theory as the following consequences of our more general results illustrate:
(i) the propositional logic of IKP is intuitionistic propositional logic IPC (see
Corollary 43),
(ii) the relative first-order logic of IKP is intuitionistic first-order logic IQC
(see Corollary 46),
(iii) the first-order logic of IKP is intuitionistic first-order logic IQC (see Corol-
lary 59), and,
(iv) the first-order logic with equality of IKP is strictly stronger than intuition-
istic first-order logic with equality IQC= (see Corollary 62).
An important byproduct of our work is a study of the possibilities and limits
of Kripke models whose domains are classical models of set theory: The common
Kripke model constructions for intuitionistic or constructive set theories, such
as CZF or IZF, that are stronger than IKP, usually involve complex recursive
constructions (see, for example, [20]). We will expose a failure of the exponen-
tiation axiom showing that these more complex constructions are necessary to
obtain models of many stronger theories (see Section 3.3.2).
This article is organised as follows. In Section 2, we will lay out the basics
needed in terms of Kripke semantics for propositional and first-order logics.
Section 3 provides an analysis of a certain Kripke model construction for IKP.
In Section 4 we will analyse the logical structure of IKP and prove several De
Jongh Theorems for propositional, relative first-order and first-order logics. We
close with some questions and directions for further research.
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2. Logics and Their Kripke Semantics
As usual, we denote intuitionistic propositional logic by IPC and intuitionis-
tic first-order logic by IQC. The classical counterparts of these logics are called
CPC and CQC, respectively. We will generally identify each logic with the set
of its consequences. A logic J is called intermediate if IPC ⊆ J ⊆ CPC in case
J is propositional logic, or IQC ⊆ J ⊆ CQC in case J is a first-order logic.
We assume intuitionistic first-order logic IQC to be formulated in a language
without equality. Intuitionistic first-order logic with equality will be denoted by
IQC=.
A Kripke frame (K,≤) is a set K equipped with a partial order ≤. A
Kripke model for IPC is a triple (K,≤, V ) such that (K,≤) is a Kripke frame
and V : Prop→ P(K) a valuation that is persistent, i.e., if w ∈ V (p) and w ≤ v,
then v ∈ V (p). We can then define, by induction on propositional formulas, the
forcing relation for propositional logic at a node v ∈ K in the following way for
a Kripke model M for IPC:
(1) M, v  p if and only if v ∈ V (p),
(2) M, v  ϕ ∧ ψ if and only if K,V, v  ϕ and K,V, v  ψ,
(3) M, v  ϕ ∨ ψ if and only if K,V, v  ϕ or K,V, v  ψ,
(4) M, v  ϕ→ ψ if and only if for all w ≥ v, K,V,w  ϕ implies K,V,w  ψ,
(5) M, v  ⊥ holds never.
We write v  ϕ instead of K,V, v  ϕ if the Kripke frame or the valuation
are clear from the context. We will write K,V  ϕ if K,V, v  ϕ holds for all
v ∈ K. A formula ϕ is valid in K if K,V, v  ϕ holds for all valuations V on K
and v ∈ K, and ϕ is valid if it is valid in every Kripke frame K.
We can now define the propositional logic of a Kripke frame and of a class
of Kripke frames.
Definition 1. If (K,≤) is a Kripke frame, we define the propositional logic
L(K,≤) to be the set of all propositional formulas that are valid in K. For a
class K of Kripke frames, we define the propositional logic L(K) to be the set
of all propositional formulas that are valid in all Kripke frames (K,≤) in K.
Given an intermediate propositional logic J, we say that K characterises J if
L(K) = J.
A Kripke model for IQC is a triple (K,≤, D, V ) where (K,≤) is a Kripke
frame, Dv a set for each v ∈ K such that Dv ⊆ Dw for v ≤ w, and V a function
such that:
(i) if p is a propositional letter, then V (p) ⊆ K such that if v ∈ V (p) and
v ≤ w, then w ∈ V (p),
(ii) if R is an n-ary relation symbol of the language of IQC, then V (R) =
{Rv | v ∈ K} such that Rv ⊆ Dnv and Rv ⊆ Rw for v ≤ w, and,
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(iii) if f is an n-ary function symbol of the language of IQC, then V (f) =
{fv | v ∈ K} such that fv is a function Dnv → Dv such that Graph(fv) ⊆
Graph(fw) for v ≤ w.
We now extend the conditions of the forcing relation for IPC to Kripke
models M for IQC in the following way:
(6) M, v  R(x0, . . . , xn−1) if and only if (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ Rv,
(7) M, v  f(x0, . . . , xn−1) = y if and only if fv(x0, . . . , xn−1) = y,
(8) M, v  ∃x ϕ(x) if and only if there is some x ∈ Dv such that K,V, v 
ϕ(x), and,
(9) M, v  ∀x ϕ(x) if and only if for all w ≥ v and x ∈ Dw it holds that
K,V,w  ϕ(x).
We can further extend these definitions to Kripke models for IQC= by in-
terpreting equality as an equivalence relation ∼v at every node v ∈ K, and
stipulate that:
(10) M, v  x = y if and only if x ∼v y.
We define the validity of formulas in frames and classes of frames just as
in the case of propositional logic. Now, we can define the first-order logic of a
Kripke frame and of a class of Kripke frames.
Definition 2. If (K,≤) is a Kripke frame, then the first-order logic QL(K,≤)
is defined to be the set of all first-order formulas that are valid in K. For a class
K of Kripke frames, we define the first-order logic QL(K) to be the set of all
first-order formulas that are valid in all Kripke frames (K,≤) in K. Given an
intermediate first-order logic J, we say that K characterises J if QL(K) = J.
Similarly, we define QL=((K,≤)) and QL=(K) as the set of all first-order
formulas in the language of equality that are valid in the respective frame or
class of frames.
We will sometimes write L(K) for L(K,≤), QL(K) for QL(K,≤), and
QL=(K) for QL=(K,≤). The next result is proved by induction on the com-
plexity of formulas; it shows that persistence of the propositional variables trans-
fers to all formulas.
Proposition 3. Let M be a Kripke model for IPC, IQC or IQC=, v ∈ K and
ϕ be a propositional formula such that M, v  ϕ holds. Then M,w  ϕ holds
for all w ≥ v.
Theorem 4. A propositional formula ϕ is derivable in IPC if and only if it is
valid in all Kripke models for IPC. In particular, a propositional formula ϕ is
derivable in IPC if and only if it is valid in all finite Kripke models for IPC. A
formula ϕ of first-order logic is derivable in IQC if and only if it is valid in all
Kripke models for IQC. Finally, a formula ϕ of first-order logic with equality
is derivable in IQC= if and only if it is valid in all Kripke models for IQC=.
4
A detailed proof of Theorem 4 can be found in the literature (e.g., [28, Chap-
ter 2, Theorem 6.6]). We use this opportunity to emphasise that we are using
IQC to denote first-order intuitionistic logic in a language without equality, and
IQC
= to denote first-order intuitionistic logic with equality (see [28, Chapter
2] for a discussion of various versions of intuitionistic first-order logic with and
without equality).
We will later need the following result on Kripke frames for IQC (without
equality).
Definition 5. We say that a Kripke model M = (K,≤, D, V ) is countable if K
is countable and Dv is countable for every v ∈ K. A Kripke model M = (K,≤
, D, V ) has countably increasing domains if for every v, w ∈ K such that v < w,
we have that Dw \Dv is a countably infinite set.
Lemma 6. LetM = (K,≤, D, V ) be a countable Kripke model for intuitionistic
first-order logic. Then there is a model M ′ = (K,≤, D′, V ′) with countably
increasing domains and a family of maps fv : Dv → D′v such that M, v  ϕ(x¯) if
and only if M ′, v  ϕ(fv(x¯)) holds for every v ∈ K. Further, if M is countable,
then so is M ′.
Proof. As M is countable, the Kripke frame (K,≤) will be countable. So let
〈vi | i < ω〉 be a bijective enumeration of all nodes of K. Let M0 = M . Given
Mn = (K,≤, Dn, V n), define Mn+1 as follows: Take a countable set Xn such
that Xn ∩
⋃
v∈K D
n
v = ∅. Now let D
n
w = D
n
w if w 6≥ vn, and D
n
w = D
n
w ∪Xn if
w ≥ vn. Extend the valuation V n of Mn to the extended domains as follows:
Pick an arbitrary element yn ∈ Dnvn and copy the valuation of yn for every
x ∈ Xn at every w ≥ vn (i.e. such that v  P (x, z¯) if and only if v  P (yn, z¯)).
Finally, takeM ′ = (K,≤, D′, V ′) where D′v =
⋃
n<ωD
n
v and V
′
v =
⋃
n<ω V
n
v .
ClearlyM ′ is countable. Further define f :
⋃
v∈K D
′
v →
⋃
v∈K Dv by stipulating
that f(x) = x if x ∈ Dv, and f(x) = yn if x ∈ Xn. An easy induction now
shows that the desired statement holds (note that the language of IQC does
not contain equality).
3. IKP and Its Kripke Semantics
In this section, we will introduce the constructive set theory that we are
going to analyse in this article, and some Kripke semantics for set theory.
3.1. Intuitionistic Kripke-Platek Set Theory
We will list the relevant axioms and axiom schemes. The language L∈ of
set theory extends the logical language with binary relation symbols ∈ and
= denoting set membership and equality, respectively. As usual, the bounded
quantifiers ∀x ∈ a ϕ(x) and ∃x ∈ a ϕ(x) are abbreviations for ∀x(x ∈ a→ ϕ(x))
5
and ∃x(x ∈ a ∧ ϕ(x)), respectively.
∃a ∀x ∈ a ⊥ (Empty Set)
∀a∀b∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ (x = a ∨ x = b)) (Pairing)
∀a∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ ∃u(u ∈ a ∧ x ∈ u)) (Union)
∀a∀b(∀x(x ∈ a↔ x ∈ b)→ a = b) (Extensionality)
∃x(∅ ∈ x ∧ (∀y y ∈ x→ y ∪ {y} ∈ x)∧ (Infinity)
(∀y y ∈ x→ (y = ∅ ∨ ∃z ∈ y y = z ∪ {z})))
(∀a(∀x ∈ a ϕ(x)→ ϕ(a)))→ ∀aϕ(a) (Set Induction)
Moreover, we have the axiom schemes of∆0-separation and∆0-collection, where
ϕ ranges over the bounded formulas:
∀a∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ a ∧ ϕ(x)) (ϕ is a ∆0-formula) (∆0-Separation)
∀a(∀x ∈ a∃yϕ(x, y)→ ∃b∀x ∈ a∃y ∈ bϕ(x, y)) (ϕ is a ∆0-formula)
(∆0-Collection)
Sometimes, these schemes are also referred to as bounded separation and bounded
collection, respectively. Removing the restriction to ∆0-formulas, we obtain the
usual schemes of separation and collection.
Definition 7. The theory IKP of intuitionistic Kripke-Platek set theory IKP
consists of the axioms and rules of intuitionistic first-order logic for the language
L∈ extended by the axioms and axiom schemes of empty set, pairing, union,
extensionality, infinity, set induction, ∆0-separation, and ∆0-collection.
IKP was first introduced and studied by Lubarsky [18]. Denote by IKP+
the theory obtained by adding the schemes of bounded strong collection and
set-bounded subset collection to IKP.
For reference, we also introduce the well-known theories of CZF and IZF. In
the following strong infinity axiom, Ind(a) is the formula denoting that a is an
inductive set: Ind(a) abbreviates ∅ ∈ a ∧ ∀x ∈ a∃y ∈ a y = {x}.
∃a(Ind(a) ∧ ∀b(Ind(b)→ ∀x ∈ a(x ∈ b))) (Strong Infinity)
Finally, we have the schemes of strong collection and subset collection for all
formulas ϕ(x, y) and ψ(x, y, u), respectively.
∀a(∀x ∈ a∃y ϕ(x, y)→ (Strong Collection)
∃b(∀x ∈ a∃y ∈ b ϕ(x, y) ∧ ∀y ∈ b∃x ∈ a ϕ(x, y)))
∀a∀b∃c∀u(∀x ∈ a∃y ∈ b ψ(x, y, u)→ (Subset Collection)
∃d ∈ c(∀x ∈ a∃y ∈ d ψ(x, y, u) ∧ ∀y ∈ d∃x ∈ a ψ(x, y, u)))
The axiom scheme obtained from strong collection when restricting ϕ to
range over∆0-formulas only will be called Bounded Strong Collection. Similarly,
we obtain the axiom scheme of Set-bounded Subset Collection from the axiom
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scheme of subset collection when restricting ψ to ∆0-formulas such that z is
set-bounded in ψ (i.e., it is possible to intuitionistically derive z ∈ t for some
term t that appears in ψ from ψ(x, y, z)).
We also need the power set axiom.
∀a∃y∀z(z ∈ y ↔ z ⊆ a) (Power Set)
Definition 8. The theory CZF of constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory con-
sists of the axioms and rules of intuitionistic first-order logic for the language L∈
extended by the axioms of extensionality, empty set, pairing, union and strong
infinity as well as the axiom schemes of set induction, bounded separation,
strong collection and subset collection.
In the statement of the following axiom of exponentiation, f : x → y is an
abbreviation for the ∆0-formula ϕ(f, x, y) stating that f is a function from x to
y.
∀x ∀y ∃z ∀f(f ∈ z ↔ f : x→ y) (Exponentiation, Exp)
The axiom of exponentiation is a constructive consequence of the axiom of subset
collection over CZF (cf. [1, Theorem 5.1.2]). Hence, a failure of exponentiation
implies a failure of subset collection. We will see in Section 3.3.2 that the Kripke
models with classical domains do not satisfy the axiom of exponentiation in
general, and therefore, they cannot satisfy full CZF.
Definition 9. The theory IZF of intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory con-
sists of the axioms and rules of intuitionistic first-order logic for the language
L∈ extended by the axioms and axiom schemes of extensionality, pairing, union,
empty set, strong infinity, separation, collection, set induction, and powerset.
3.2. Kripke Models for the Language of Set Theory
By extending the Kripke models introduced above, we can obtain models for
intuitionistic first-order logic. Instead of developing this theory in full generality,
we will focus on the subcase of Kripke models for set theory.
Definition 10. A Kripke model (K,≤, D, e) for set theory is a Kripke frame
(K,≤) for IPC with a collection of domains D = {Dv | v ∈ K} and a collection
of set-membership relations e = {ev | v ∈ K}, such that the following hold:
(i) ev is a binary relation on Dv for every v ∈ K, and,
(ii) Dv ⊆ Dw and ev ⊆ ew for all w ≥ v ∈ K.
Examples of Kripke models for set theory are not only the Kripke models
with classical domains that we will introduce in Section 3.3, but also the Kripke
models introduced by Lubarsky [19, 20], by Diener and Lubarsky [21] and by
Lubarsky and Rathjen [22]; recently Passmann [25] introduced the so-called
blended Kripke models for set theory to prove de Jongh’s theorem for IZF and
CZF.
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We can now extend the forcing relation to Kripke models for set theory to
interpret the language of set theory L∈. For the following definition, we tacitly
enrich the language of set theory with constant symbols for every element of the
domains of the Kripke model at hand.
Definition 11. Let (K,≤, D, e) be a Kripke model for set theory. We define,
by induction on L∈-formulas, the forcing relation at every node of a Kripke
frame in the following way, where ϕ and ψ are formulas with all free variables
shown, and y¯ = y0, . . . , yn−1 are elements of Dv for the node v considered on
the left side:
(i) (K,≤, D, e), v  a ∈ b if and only if (a, b) ∈ ev,
(ii) (K,≤, D, e), v  a = b if and only if a = b,
(iii) (K,≤, D, e), v  ∃xϕ(x, y¯) if and only if there is some a ∈ Dv
with (K,≤, D, e), v  ϕ(a, y¯),
(iv) (K,≤, D, e), v  ∀xϕ(x, y¯) if and only if for all w ≥ v and a ∈ Dw
we have (K,≤, D, e), w  ϕ(a, y¯).
The cases for →, ∧, ∨ and ⊥ are analogous to the ones in the above definition
of the forcing relation for Kripke models for IPC. We will write v  ϕ (or
K, v  ϕ) instead of (K,≤, D, e), v  ϕ if the Kripke model is clear from the
context. An L∈-formula ϕ is valid in K if v  ϕ holds for all v ∈ K, and ϕ
is valid if it is valid in every Kripke frame K. Finally, we will call (K,≤) the
underlying Kripke frame of (K,≤, D, e).
Persistence also holds in Kripke models for set theory.
Proposition 12. Let (K,≤, V ) be a Kripke model for set theory, v ∈ K and
ϕ be a formula in the language of set theory such that K, v  ϕ holds. Then
K,w  ϕ holds for all w ≥ v.
Remark 13. We have now introduced four kinds of Kripke models: for IPC,
for IQC, for IQC=, and for set theory. The reader might have noticed that
Kripke models for set theory are just a special instance of the Kripke models for
IQC
= where equality is interpreted as actual equality on the domains. Kripke
models for IQC= do in general not interpret equality this way and only require
an equivalence relation, and Kripke models for IQC do not have equality at all.
Using this distinction, we are making explicit when we talk about Kripke models
for certain logics and when we are talking about Kripke models for certain set
theories.
3.3. Kripke Models with Classical Domains
The idea is to obtain models of set theory by assigning classical models of ZF
set theory to every node of a Kripke frame. We will first introduce Kripke models
with classical domains and explain some of their basic properties. Afterwards,
we will indicate their limitations in modelling strong set theories by exhibiting
a failure of the exponentiation axiom.
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3.3.1. Definitions and Basic Properties
We will closely follow the presentation of Iemhoff [15] but give up on some
generality that is not needed here. We will start by giving a condition for when
an assignment of models to nodes is suitable for our purposes.
Definition 14. Let (K,≤) be a Kripke frame. An assignment M : K → V of
transitive models of ZF set theory to nodes of K is called sound for K if for all
nodes v, w ∈ K with v ≤ w we have that M(v) ⊆M(w), M(v)  x ∈ y implies
M(w)  x ∈ y, and M(v)  x = y implies M(w)  x = y.
For convenience, we will writeMv forM(v). Of course, this could be readily
generalised to homomorphisms of models of set theory that are not necessarily
inclusions, but we will not need this level of generality here.
Definition 15. Given a Kripke frame (K,≤) and a sound assignmentM : K →
V , we define the Kripke model with classical domains K(M) to be the Kripke
model for set theory (K,≤,M, e) where ev = ∈ ↾ (Mv ×Mv).
Persistence for Kripke models with classical domains is a special case of
persistence for Kripke models for set theory.
Proposition 16. If K(M) is a Kripke model with classical domains with nodes
v, w ∈ K such that v ≤ w, then for all formulas ϕ, K(M), v  ϕ implies
K(M), w  ϕ.
We will now analyse the set theory satisfied by these models.
Definition 17. We say that a set-theoretic formula ϕ(x0, . . . , xn−1) is evaluated
locally if for all Kripke models with classical domains K(M), where M is a
sound assignment, we have K(M), v  ϕ(a0, . . . , an−1) if and only if Mv 
ϕ(a0, . . . , an−1) for all a0, . . . , an−1 ∈Mv.
Proposition 18. If ϕ is a ∆0-formula, then ϕ is evaluated locally.
Proof. This statement can be shown by actually proving a stronger statement
by induction on ∆0-formulas, simultaneously for all v ∈ K. Namely, we can
show that for all w ≥ v it holds that w  ϕ(a0, . . . , an) if and only if Mv 
ϕ(a0, . . . , an). To prove the case of the bounded universal quantifier and the
case of implication, we need that the quantifier is outside in the sense that our
induction hypothesis will be:
∀w ≥ v(w  ϕ(a0, . . . , an) ⇐⇒ Mv  ϕ(a0, . . . , an)).
With this setup, the induction follows straightforwardly.
Theorem 19 (Iemhoff, [15, Corollary 4]). Let K(M) be a Kripke model with
classical domains. Then K(M)  IKP+.
Recall that Markov’s principle MP is formulated in the context of set theory
as follows:
∀α : N→ 2 (¬∀n ∈ N α(n) = 0→ ∃n ∈ N α(n) = 1)
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Proposition 20. Let K(M) be a Kripke model with classical domains. Then
K(M)  MP.
Proof. Let v ∈ K and α ∈ Mv be given such that v  “α is a function α→ 2”.
By Proposition 18, we know that α is such a function also in the classical model
Mv. Further observe that ¬∀n ∈ N α(n) = 0 → ∃n ∈ N α(n) = 1 is a ∆0-
formula and therefore evaluated locally by Proposition 18. Now this statement
is clearly true of α because Mv is a classical model of ZF.
Extended Church’s Thesis ECT does not hold.3 Let us conclude this section
with the following curious observation.
Proposition 21. If K(M) is a Kripke model with classical domains such that
every Mv is a model of the axiom of choice, then the axiom of choice holds in
K(M).
Proof. Recall that the axiom of choice is the following statement:
∀a((∀x ∈ a∀y ∈ a (x 6= y → x ∩ y = ∅))→ ∃b∀x ∈ a∃!z ∈ b z ∈ x). (AC)
Let v ∈ K and a ∈ Mv such that v  ∀x ∈ a∀y ∈ a (x 6= y → x ∩ y = ∅).
This is a ∆0-formula, so we can apply Proposition 18 to derive thatMv  ∀x ∈
a∀y ∈ a (x 6= y → x ∩ y = ∅). As Mv  AC, there is some b ∈ Mv such
that Mv  ∀x ∈ a∃!z ∈ b z ∈ x. Again, this is a ∆0-formula, so it holds that
v  ∀x ∈ a∃!z ∈ b z ∈ x. As b ∈ Mv, we have v  ∃b∀x ∈ a∃!z ∈ b z ∈ x. But
this shows that v  AC.
As IKP+ contains the bounded separation axiom, it follows that AC implies
the law of excluded middle for bounded formulas in the models of the proposition
(see [1, Chapter 10.1]). We summarise the results of this section in the following
corollary.
Corollary 22. If K(M) is a Kripke model with classical domains such that
everyMv is a model of the axiom of choice, then K(M)  IKP
++MP+AC.
3.3.2. A Failure of Exponentiation
In this section, we will exhibit a failure of the axiom of exponentiation in
particular Kripke models with classical domains.
Proposition 23. Let K(M) be a Kripke model with classical domains such
that there are v, w ∈ K with v < w. If a, b ∈ Mv and g : a → b is a function
contained in Mw but not in Mv, then K(M) 6 Exp.
Proof. Assume, for a contradiction, that K(M)  Exp. Further, assume that
a, b ∈ Mv and g : a→ b is a function contained in Mw but not in Mv. Then,
K(M), v  ∀x ∀y ∃z ∀f(f ∈ z ↔ f : x→ y),
3This follows because under MP and ECT all functions f : R → R are continuous (see [1,
Theorem 16.0.23]) but that is in general not the case here.
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and by the definition of our semantics this just means that there is some c ∈ Mv
such that K(M), v  ∀f(f ∈ c ↔ f : a → b). By the semantics of universal
quantification, this means thatK(M), w  g ∈ c ↔ g : a→ b. Since g is indeed
a function from a → b, it follows that K(M), w  g ∈ c. As c is a member of
Mv by assumption, we have g ∈ c ∈ Mv. Hence, by transitivity, g ∈ Mv. But
this is a contradiction to our assumption that g is not contained in Mv.
Of course, when adding a generic filter for a non-trivial forcing notion, we
always add such a function, namely the characteristic function of the generic
filter. Therefore, Proposition 23 yields:
Corollary 24. Let K(M) be a Kripke model with classical domains. If there
are nodes v < w ∈ K such that Mw is a non-trivial generic extension of Mv
(i.e., Mw = Mv[G] for some generic G /∈ Mv), then it is not a model of
CZF.
In Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic, K(M)  ¬ϕ is strictly stronger
than K(M) 6 ϕ. The above results give an instance of the latter (a so-called
weak counterexample), now we will provide an example of the former (a strong
counterexample).
Proposition 25. There is a Kripke model with classical domains K(M) that
forces the negation of the exponentiation axiom, i.e., K(M)  ¬Exp.
Proof. Consider the Kripke frame K = (ω,<) where < is the standard ordering
of the natural numbers. Construct the assignment M as follows: Choose M0
to be any countable and transitive model of ZFC. If Mi is constructed, let
Mi+1 =Mi[Gi] where Gi is generic for Cohen forcing overMi (actually, every
non-trivial forcing notion does the job). Clearly, M is a sound assignment of
models of set theory. Now, we want to show that for every i ∈ ω we have that
i  ¬Exp, i.e., for all j ≥ i we need to show that j  Exp implies j  ⊥. This,
however, is done exactly as in the proof of Proposition 23, where the witnesses
are the characteristic functions χGi of the generic filters Gi.
3.4. Classical Domains and the Constructible Universe
We define the relativisation ϕ 7→ ϕL of a formula of set theory to the con-
structible universe L in the usual way. Note, however, that in our setting the
evaluation of universal quantifiers and implications is in general not local (in
contrast to classical models of set theory). Nevertheless, we will now show that—
under mild assumptions—statements about the constructible universe can be
evaluated locally. The following is a well-known fact.
Fact 26 ([16, Lemma 13.14]). There is a Σ1-formula ϕ(x) such that in any
model M  ZFC, we have M  ϕ(x)↔ x ∈ L.
From now on, let x ∈ L be an abbreviation for ϕ(x), where ϕ is the Σ1-
formula from Fact 26.
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Proposition 27. Let K be a Kripke frame andM a sound assignment of nodes
to transitive models of ZFC. Then K(M), v  x ∈ L if and only if Mv  x ∈ L,
i.e., the formula x ∈ L is evaluated locally.
Proof. Recall that the existential quantifier is defined locally, i.e., the witness
for the quantification must be found within the domain associated to the current
node in the Kripke model. Then, the statement of the proposition follows from
the fact that ∆0-formulas are evaluated locally by Proposition 18.
The crucial detail of the following technical Lemma 29 is the fact that the
constructible universe is absolute between inner models of set theory. We will
therefore need to strengthen the notion of a sound assignment. If N and M
are transitive models of set theory, we say that N is an inner model of M if
N ⊆M , N is a model of ZFC, N is a transitive class of M , and N contains all
the ordinals of M (see [16, p. 182]).
Definition 28. Let K be a Kripke frame. We say that a sound assignment
M : K → V agrees on L if there is a transitive model N  ZFC + V = L such
that N is an inner model of Mv for every v ∈ K.
In particular, if K is a Kripke frame and M : K → V agrees on L, then we
are justified in referring to the constructible universe L from the point of view
of all models in M.
Lemma 29. Let K be a Kripke frame andM be a sound assignment that agrees
on L. Then the following are equivalent for any formula ϕ(x) in the language
of set theory, and all parameters a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ L:
(i) for all v ∈ K, we have K(M), v  (ϕ(a0, . . . , an−1))L,
(ii) for all v ∈ K, we have Mv  (ϕ(a0, . . . , an−1))L,
(iii) there is a v ∈ K such that Mv  (ϕ(a0, . . . , an−1))L, and,
(iv) L  ϕ(a0, . . . , an−1).
Proof. By our assumption, a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ Mv for all v ∈ K as L ⊆ Mv for all
v ∈ K. The equivalence of (ii), (iii) and (iv) follows directly from the fact that
L is absolute between inner models of ZFC.
The equivalence of (i) and (ii) can be proved by an induction on set-theoretic
formulas simultaneously for all nodes in K with the induction hypothesis as in
the proof of Proposition 18. For the case of the universal quantifier, we make
use of the fact thatM agrees on L (hence, that L is absolute between all models
Mv for v ∈ K), and apply Proposition 27.
4. The Logical Structure of IKP
The aim of this section is to analyse the propositional and first-order logics
of IKP. First, we will introduce the logics of interest in a general way, and then
proceed to introduce a Kripke model construction that we will use to determine
certain logics of IKP+.
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4.1. Logics and the De Jongh Property
We will be concerned with both propositional and first-order logics.
Definition 30. A propositional translation σ : Prop → LsentT is a map from
propositional letters to sentences in the appropriate language that is extended
to formulas in the obvious way.
A first-order translation σ : LJ → LformT is a map from the collection of
relation symbols of LJ to L∈-formulas such that n-ary relation symbols are
mapped to formulas with n-free variables. Then σ is extended to all predicate
formulas in LJ in the obvious way.
If J is a first-order logic with equality and T a theory with equality, then
a first-order equality translation σ is a first-order translation with the extra
condition that equality of J is mapped to equality T .
Following Visser [29, Section 2.2], we only consider the case of predicate
languages that contain only relation symbols by eliminating any function sym-
bol f by replacing it with a relation Rf (x0, . . . , xn, y) defined by the equality
f(x0, . . . , xn) = y. If we eliminate a function symbol in such a way, we demand
that the interpreting theory T proves that σ(Rf ) is the graph of a function
(i.e., σ being a translation is then dependent on the theory T ). Nested function
symbols can be eliminated with the usual procedure of introducing variables for
the intermediate values.
Further, given a first-order logic J , we will make use of the relative transla-
tion (·)E (where we shall always tacitly assume that E is a fresh unary predicate
symbol) that acts non-trivially only on quantifiers:
(∃x ϕ(x))E = (∃x(Ex ∧ ϕE(x))), and,
(∀x ϕ(x))E = (∀x(Ex→ ϕE(x))).
Definition 31. Given a theory T , formulated in a language LT , we define the
following logics:
(i) The propositional logic L(T ) of T consists of the propositional formulas
ϕ such that T ⊢ ϕσ for all propositional translations σ.
(ii) The first-order logicQL(T ) of T consists of the first-order formulas ϕ such
that T ⊢ ϕσ for all first-order translations σ in the language LT .
(iii) The relative first-order logicQLE(T ) of T consists of the first-order formu-
las ϕ such that T ⊢ (ϕE)σ for all first-order translations σ in the language
LT ∪{E}, where E is the fresh unary predicate symbol introduced for the
relative translation.
(iv) The first-order logic with equality QL=(T ) of T consists of the first-order
formulas ϕ such that T ⊢ ϕσ for all first-order equality translations σ in
the language LT .
Definition 32. Let T be a theory and J a logic. We define the theory T (J) as
follows:
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(i) If J is a propositional logic, we define T (J) to be the theory obtained
from T by adding all sentences of the form Aσ for formulas A ∈ J and
propositional translations σ.
(ii) If J is a first-order logic, we define T (J) to be the theory obtained from T
by adding all sentences of the form Aσ for formulas A ∈ J and first-order
translations σ.
Definition 33. We say that a theory T satisfies the de Jongh property for a
logic J if L(T (J)) = J . A theory T based on intuitionistic logic satisfies de
Jongh’s theorem if L(T ) = IPC.
Before embarking on determining some logics of IKP+, let us survey a few
known results. De Jongh [5, 6] started the investigations of logics of arith-
metical theories, establishing that L(HA) = IPC and QLE(HA) = IQC. De
Jongh, Verbrugge and Visser [7] introduced the de Jongh property and showed—
among other results—that L(HA(J)) = J for logics J that are characterised by
classes of finite frames. Considering a logic that is weaker than intuitionistic
logic, Ardeshir and Mojtahedi [2] proved that the propositional logic of basic
arithmetic is the basic propositional calculus.
For the sake of a counterexample to the de Jongh property, consider the the-
ory HA+MP+ECT0, i.e., Heyting arithmetic extended with Markov’s Principle
(MP) and Extended Church’s Thesis (ECT0). Even though these principles are
considered constructive, one can show that the propositional logic of this theory
is an intermediate logic, i.e., IPC ( L(HA+MP+ ECT0) ( CPC (this follows
from results of Rose [26] and McCarty [23]; for details see the discussion at the
end of [7, Section 2]). In conclusion, HA+MP+ECT0 does not satisfy de Jongh’s
theorem.
Turning now towards set theory, Passmann [25] used a Kripke-model con-
struction to show that L(IZF) = L(CZF) = IPC, and, in fact, that L(T (J)) = J
for every set theory T ⊆ IZF and every logic J characterised by a class of finite
frames. H. Friedman and Ščedrov [10] conclude from their earlier conservativity
results [9] that L(ZFI) = IPC holds for the two-sorted theory ZFI.
If C is a class of formulas, we write LC(T ) for the propositional logic of T
where we restrict to the class of translations to maps σ with ran(σ) ⊆ C. We
define QLC(T ) and QLCE(T ) in the same way.
An important observation of H. Friedman and Ščedrov is the following.
Theorem 34 (H. Friedman and Ščedrov, [10, Theorem 1.1]). Let T be a set
theory based on intuitionistic logic. Suppose that T includes the axioms of Ex-
tensionality, Separation, Pairing and (finite) Union. Then IQC ( QL(T ), i.e.,
the first-order logic of T is stronger than intuitionistic first-order logic.
This implies, in particular, that IZF does not satisfy the de Jongh property
for IQC. As CZF only contains ∆0-separation but full separation is used in the
proof of the above theorem, the theorem does not apply to CZF. However, with
a slight adaption of the proof of H. Friedman and Ščedrov we can observe the
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following theorem. If C is a class of formulas, we denote the separation scheme
restricted to formulas from C by C-Separation.
Theorem 35. Let T be a set theory based on intuitionistic logic and C be a
class of formulas. Suppose that T includes the axioms of Extensionality, C-
Separation, Pairing and (finite) Union. Then IQC ( QLC(T ), i.e., the C-
first-order logic of T , QLC(T ), is stronger than intuitionistic first-order logic.
So, in particular, IQC ( QL∆0(CZF), i.e., the ∆0-first-order logic of CZF
is strictly stronger than intuitionistic logic. On the other hand, A ∨ ¬A /∈
QL∆0(CZF), so IQC ( QL∆0(CZF) ( CQC.
4.2. Constructing the Models
We will now introduce a class of Kripke models with classical domains that
arise from certain classical models of set theory. These models will later be used
to prove our results on logics of IKP.
S. Friedman, Fuchino and Sakai [11] presented family of sentences that we are
going to use to imitate the logical behaviour of a given Kripke frame. Consider
the following statements ψi:
There is an injection from ℵLi+2 to P(ℵ
L
i ).
There are different ways of formalising these statements that are classically
equivalent, but (possibly) differ in the way they are evaluated in a Kripke model.
For our purposes, we choose to define the sentence ψi like this:
∃x∃y∃g((x = ℵi+2)
L ∧ (y = ℵi)
L
∧ g “is an injective function”
∧ dom(g) = x
∧ ∀α ∈ x∀z ∈ g(α) z ∈ y)
Note that this is a Σ1-formula. The main reason for this choice of formalisation
is that the semantics of the existential quantifier is local, which will allow us to
prove the following crucial observation.
Proposition 36. Let K be a Kripke frame and M a sound assignment that
agrees on L. Then K(M), v  ψi if and only if Mv  ψi, i.e., the sentences ψi
are evaluated locally.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 29, Proposition 18 and the fact that the se-
mantics of the existential quantifier is local, i.e., the sets x, y and g of the above
statement must (or may not) be found within Mv. In this situation, it suffices
to argue that the following conjunction is evaluated locally:
(x = ℵi+2)
L ∧ (y = ℵi)
L ∧ g “is an injective function”
∧ dom(g) = x
∧ ∀α ∈ x∀z ∈ g(α) z ∈ y.
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It suffices to argue that every conjunct is evaluated locally. For the first two
conjuncts of the form ϕL this holds by Lemma 29. The final three conjuncts are
∆0-formulas. So we can apply Proposition 18 and the desired result follows.
We will now obtain a collection of models of set theory using the forcing
notions from S. Friedman, Fuchino and Sakai in [11]. From this collection, we
define models with classical domains by constructing sound assignments that
agree on L.
Construction 37. We begin by setting up the forcing construction. By our
assumption that there is a countable transitive model of set theory, we can
choose a minimal countable ordinal α such that Lα is a model of ZFC + V =
L. We fix this α for the rest of the article. Let Qβ,n be the forcing notion4
Fn(ℵLβ+n+2, 2,ℵ
L
β+n), defined within Lα. Given A ⊆ ω, we define the following
forcings:
PAβ,n =
{
Qβ,n, if n ∈ A,
1, otherwise.
Then let PAβ =
∏
n<ω P
A
β,n be the full support product of the forcing notions
PAβ,n. Recall that the ordering < on P
A
β is defined by (ai)i∈ω < (bi)i∈ω if and
only if ai <i bi for all i ∈ ω. Now, let Gβ be Pωβ -generic over L, and let
Gβ,n = pin[G] be the n-th projection of Gβ . Let H be the trivial generic filter
on the trivial forcing 1. Now, for A ⊆ ω and n ∈ ω define the collection of
filters:
GAβ,n =
{
Gβ,n, if n ∈ A,
H, otherwise,
and let GAβ =
∏
n<ω G
A
β,n.
Proposition 38. The filter GAβ is P
A
β -generic over Lα.
Proposition 39. If A ⊆ B ⊆ ω and A ∈ L[GBβ ], then L[G
A
β ] ⊆ L[G
B
β ]. Indeed,
L[GAβ ] is an inner model of L[G
B
β ].
The additional assumption A ∈ L[GB] is necessary because there are forcing
extensions that cannot be amalgamated (see [12, Observation 35] for a discussion
of this). The following generalised proposition of S. Friedman, Fuchino and Sakai
is crucial for our purposes.5
Proposition 40 (S. Friedman, Fuchino and Sakai, [11, Proposition 5.1]). Let β
be an ordinal, i ∈ ω and A ⊆ ω. Then Lα[GAβ ]  ψβ+i if and only if i ∈ A.
4The notation Fn(I, J, λ) is introduced by Kunen in [17, Definition 6.1] and denotes the
set of all partial functions p : I → J of cardinality less than λ ordered by reversed inclusion.
5In different terminology, the statement of the following proposition is that the sentences
ψi constitute a family of so-called independent buttons for set-theoretical forcing. This termi-
nology originates from the modal logic of forcing, see the article [14] of Hamkins and Löwe.
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Proof. S. Friedman, Fuchino and Sakai prove this proposition for the case β = 0.
The generalised version can be proved in exactly the same way.
This concludes our preparatory work, and we can state our main technical
tool of this section as the following theorem.
Theorem 41. Let β < α be an ordinal, (K,≤) be a Kripke frame and f : K →
P(ω) be a monotone function such that f(v) ∈ Lα for all v ∈ K. Then there is
a sound assignment M that agrees on Lα such that K(M), v  ψi if and only
if there is j ∈ f(v) such that i = β + j.
Proof. Let (K,≤) be a Kripke frame and f : K → P(ω) be a function such that
f(v) ∈ Lα for all v ∈ K. Let Mv = Lα[G
f(v)
β ]. This is a well-defined sound
assignment that agrees on L by Proposition 39. By Proposition 40, it holds
that i ∈ f(v) if and only if Mv  ψi. Proposition 36 implies that the latter is
equivalent to K(M), v  ψi. The result follows.
4.3. Propositional Logics and IKP
We are now ready to prove a rather general result on the logics for which
IKP satisfies the de Jongh property. The essential idea is to transform a Kripke
model for propositional logic into a Kripke model for set theory in such a way
that the models exhibit very similar logical properties. In particular, if the
logical model does not force a certain formula ϕ, then we will construct a set-
theoretic model and a translation τ such that the set-theoretic model will not
force ϕτ .
Recall that an intermediate logic J is called Kripke-complete if there is a
class of Kripke frames C such that J = L(C).
Theorem 42. Let T ⊆ IKP+ + MP + AC be a set theory. If J is a Kripke-
complete intermediate propositional logic, then LΣ1(T (J)) = J .
Proof. The inclusion from right to left follows directly from the definition of
T (J). We show the converse inclusion by contraposition. So assume that there
is a formula ϕ in the language of propositional logic such that J 6⊢ ϕ. By our
assumption that J is Kripke-complete, there is a Kripke model (K,≤, V ) such
that (K,≤, V )  J but (K,≤, V ) 6 ϕ. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that the propositional letters appearing in ϕ are p0, . . . , pn. We define
a function f : K → P(N) by stipulating that:
i ∈ f(v) if and only if i ≤ n and (K,≤, V ), v  pi.
In particular, f(v) is finite and thus f(v) ∈ L for every v ∈ K. Apply Theo-
rem 41 to get a sound assignmentM that agrees on L such that K(M), v  ψi
if and only if i ∈ f(v).
Let σ : Prop → Lsent∈ be the map pi 7→ ψi. It follows via an easy induction
on propositional formulas that K(M), v  χσ if and only if (K,≤, V ), v  χ. In
particular, K(M) 6 ϕσ but K(M)  T (J). Hence, ϕ /∈ L(T (J)).
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Corollary 43. Every set theory T ⊆ IKP++MP+AC has the de Jongh property
with respect to every Kripke-complete intermediate propositional logic J , i.e.,
L(T (J)) = J .
De Jongh, Verbrugge and Visser [7] proved a similar result for Heyting arith-
metic HA, namely, that L(HA(J)) = J holds for every intermediate propositional
logic J which possesses the finite frame property. Passmann [25] showed that
L(IZF(J)) = J holds for every intermediate logic J that is complete with respect
to a class of finite trees. Our present Corollary 43, however, applies to a much
broader class of logics: all intermediate logics that are complete with respect to
a class of Kripke frames.
4.4. The Relative First-Order Logic of IKP
When it comes to first-order logics, several intricacies arise that concern the
interplay of the logics and the surrounding set theory. We were able to ignore
these intricacies in the previous section when we were dealing with propositional
logics because we effectively reduced the problem to finitely many propositional
letters. In the case of first-order logic, however, we need to deal with infinite
domains and predication.
The basic idea remains the same: We will construct a set-theoretical model
based on a Kripke model for first-order logic. This time, however, we also need
to deal with domains and predication. We will see that working with relative
interpretations allows us to easily adapt the proof of the previous section for
our purposes here: We will use the statements ψi to code domains of Kripke
models for IQC as subsets of ω as well as coding which predications hold true.
Theorem 44. Let T ⊆ IKP+ + MP + AC be a set theory. If J ∈ Lα is an
intermediate first-order logic such that Lα  “J is a Kripke-complete logic in a
countable language”, then QLΣ1E (T (J)) = J .
Proof. Again, the inclusion from right to left is trivial and we prove the other
direction by contraposition.
Let J ∈ Lα be a first-order logic such that “J is Kripke-complete” holds in
Lα. Let J 6⊢ ϕ for some first-order sentence ϕ. We have to find a map σ such
that T (J) 6⊢ (ϕE)σ.
Work in Lα. By the fact that J 6⊢ ϕ and that J is Kripke-complete, we know
that there is first-order Kripke model M = (K,≤, D, I) ∈ Lα such that M 6 ϕ.
As we work in a classical meta-theory, we apply the downward Löwenheim-
Skolem-Theorem by coding M as first-order structure and assume without loss
of generality that M is countable. Fix enumerations d : ω →
⋃
D of the union
of all domains of the model M , C : ω → LJ of all constant symbols appearing
in LJ , R : ω → LJ of all relation symbols appearing in LJ , and F : ω → LJ
of all function symbols appearing in LJ (in each case, if there are only finitely
many symbols, restrict the domain to some n ∈ ω).
Still working in Lα, we will now code all information about M in sets of
natural numbers. Without loss of generality, we can assume that Dv ⊆ ω for
all v ∈ K, and that the transition functions are inclusions. Fix now a map
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〈·〉 : ω<ω → ω. For v ∈ K, we let k ∈ f(v) if and only if one of the following
cases holds true:
(i) k = 〈0, j〉 and j ∈ Dv,
(ii) k = 〈1, i, j0, . . . , jn−1〉, Ri is an n-ary relation symbol, j0, . . . , jn−1 ∈ Dv
and
v  Ri(j0, . . . , jn−1).
Observe that we have defined a function f : K → P(ω). This f is monotone
due to the persistence property of Kripke models.
Now work in V , and apply Theorem 41 to obtain a sounds assignment M
that agrees on L such that K(M), v  ψk if and only if k ∈ f(v). We define a
translation σ:
(i) if χ = Et, where E is the predicate of the relative translation, then
(Et)σ = ψ〈0,tσ〉, and,
(ii) if Ri(t0, . . . , tn−1) is an n-ary relation symbol different from the existential
predicate E, then Ri(t0, . . . , tn−1)σ = ψ〈1,i,tσ
0
,...,tσn−1〉
.
Note that the sentences ψi are uniformly defined for i ∈ ω, and therefore
the translation σ is well-defined. With an easy induction on formulas χ in the
language of J we show that K(M), v  χσ if and only if M, v  χ. We can then
conclude that K(M) 6 ϕσ but K(M)  Jσ, i.e., ϕ /∈ QLE(T ).
The following corollary shows that the theorem covers many important cases.
Recall that a logic is axiomatisable if it has a recursively enumberable axioma-
tisation.
Corollary 45. Let T ⊆ IKP+ +MP + AC be a set theory. If J is an axioma-
tisable intermediate first-order logic that is ZFC-provably Kripke-complete, then
QL
Σ1
E (T (J)) = J .
Proof. By Craig’s Lemma [4], we know that axiomatisable logics are recursively
axiomatisable, i.e., we can assume without loss of generality that J is a recursive
set. As recursive sets are ∆01-definable with parameter ω (as a coding of Turing
machines in arithmetic), it follows that J ∈ Lω+2 ⊆ Lα. Hence, we can apply
Theorem 44 and derive the desired result.
Corollary 46. Let T ⊆ IKP+ +MP + AC be a set theory. The relative first-
order logic of T is intuitionistic first-order logic IQC, i.e., QLE(T ) = IQC. In
particular, QLE(IKP) = IQC.
We give a few more examples of logics to which Corollary 45 applies. To
this end, note that KF is the following scheme:
¬¬∀x(P (x) ∨ ¬P (x)).
Moreover,QHPk is the first-order logic of frames of depth at most k, and QLC
is the first-order logic of linear frames. For more on these logics, we refer the
reader to the book of Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov [13].
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Corollary 47. Let T ⊆ IKP+ + MP + AC be a set theory. It holds that
QL
Σ1
E (T (J)) = J in case that J is one of IQC+KF, QHPk or QLC.
Proof. This follows from Corollary 45 and the respective completeness theorems
from [13] (see [13, Theorem 6.3.5] for the completeness of IQC+KF, [13, Theo-
rem 6.3.8] for completeness of QHPk, and [13, Theorem 6.7.1] for completeness
of QLC).
4.5. The First-Order Logic of IKP
The most important result of this section is that the first-order logic of IKP
is intuitionistic first-order logic, i.e., QL(IKP) = IQC. We will show this by
generalising the argument of the previous sections. Our first step will be to
construct the necessary Kripke models for set theory.
Our approach in this section will be somewhat different from what we did in
the previous two sections. As we now have to deal with unrestricted quantifi-
cation, we have to give up the idea of coding directly into the classical models
Mv which propositions or predications must be true at a certain node. Rather,
the idea is we will now encode enough information such that the models knows
internally which predication must hold at which node. We remind the reader
that we consider IQC to be intuitionistic first-order logic without equality.
Construction 48. Recall that we take Lα to be the least transitive model of
ZFC + V = L. Let (K,≤, D, V ) ∈ Lα be a well-founded rooted Kripke model
for IQC. Work in Lα. By Lemma 6 we can assume that there is a rooted
well-founded countable Kripke model (K,≤, D, V ) with countably increasing
domains. Without loss of generality, we may assume that Dv ⊆ ω for all v ∈ K,
and Dv ⊆ Dw for v ≤ w. Let D∗v = Dv \
⋃
w<vDw. We can assume by
well-foundedness and shuffling of the domains, if necessary, that for every x ∈⋃
v∈K Dv, there is a unique node vx ∈ K with x ∈ D
∗
vx
. As K is countable, we
can take an injective function f : K → ω \ {0}. Moreover, for every node v ∈ K
let fv : ω → D∗v be the unique order preserving enumeration of D
∗
v. Define a
function t : K × ω → P((ω × ω)<ω) such that for every n-ary predicate P and
v ∈ K:
t(v, pPq) = {((f−1vx0 (x0), vx0), . . . , (f
−1
vxn
(xn), vxn)) | v  P (x0, . . . , xn)}
By V = L, there is an ordinal γ such that the tuple (K,≤, f, t) is the γ-th
element in the canonical well-ordering of L. Let F : K → P(ω) be the function
such that F (v) = {f(w) |w ≤ v} ∪ {0}.
By Theorem 41, there is a Kripke model K(M) with classical domains such
that K(M), v  ψi if and only if there is j ∈ F (v) such that i = γ + j.
Definition 49. We call K(M) a mimic model of M = (K,≤, D, V ). Further,
we say that γ is the essential ordinal of the mimic model K(M).
We will sometimes refer to (K,≤, f, t) as the coded model of K(M). In the
following series of lemmas, we will spell out the way in which the mimic models
can recover the information about the coded model.
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Lemma 50. There is a Σ1-formula ϕess(x) in the language of set theory such
that K(M), v  ϕess(x) if and only if x is the essential ordinal γ of K(M).
Proof. We define the formula ϕess(x) as follows:
ϕess(x) ≡ x ∈ Ord ∧ ψx ∧ ∀β ∈ x¬ψβ
By the definition of the mimic model K(M), we know that K(M)  ψγ and
K(M) 6 ψi for i < γ, i.e., K(M)  ¬ψi for all i < γ. As being an ordinal can be
expressed by a ∆0-formula, it follows that K(M)  γ ∈ Ord∧ψγ ∧∀β ∈ γ ¬ψβ .
Conversely, if K(M), v  ϕess(x), then it follows that x ∈ Mv is an ordinal
such that Mv  ψx and for all β < x and w ≥ v we have Mv  ¬ψβ . By the
definition of K(M) it must hold that x = γ.
Lemma 51. There is a Σ1-formula ϕorig(x) in the language of set theory, using
the essential ordinal γ as a parameter, such that K(M), v  ϕorig(x) if and only
if x is the coded model of K(M) (i.e., x = (K,≤, f, t)).
Proof. Consider the following formula:
ϕorig(x, y) ≡ “x is the y-th element in the canonical well-ordering of L”L
Now, by Lemma 29, K(M), v  ϕorig(x, γ) is equivalent to
Lα  “x is the γ-th element int he canonical well-rodering of L”.
The definition of the essential ordinal ensures that this is the case if and only
if x = (K,≤, f, t). To observe that ϕorig(x, y) is a Σ1-formula use the fact that
the canonical well-ordering of L is Σ1-definable (see [16, Lemma 13.19]).
Lemma 52. There is a Σ1-formula ϕexists(x, y) in the language of set theory,
using the coded model (K,≤, f, t) and the essential ordinal γ as parameters, such
that K(M), v  ϕexists(x, y) if and only if y ∈ K such that y ≤ v and x ∈My.
Proof. Recall from Section 4.2 that Mv is the model Lα[GAvγ ] where G
Av
γ is
Lα-generic for PAvγ and Av = {0} ∪ {f(w) |w ≤ v}. Consider the following
formula:
ϕexists(x, y) ≡ ∃P ∈ L(“P = PAγ where A = {0} ∪ {f(w) |w ∈ K ∧ w ≤ y}”
L
∧ ∃τ ∈ L(“τ is a P-name” ∧ ∃G(G is generic for P and τG = x))).
Note the use of the parameters (K,≤, f, t) and γ, and observe that this formula
is evaluated locally as it is constructed from ∆0-formulas, formulas relativised
to L and existential quantification.
Let w ∈ K such that w ≤ v. By general facts about set-theoretical forcing,
x ∈ Mw = Lα[GAwγ ] if and only if there exists a P
Aw
γ -name τ ∈ Lα such that
τG
Aw
γ = x. Equivalently, Mv  ϕexists(x,w), and in turn holds if and only if
K(M), v  ϕexists(x,w), by our observation on local evaluation.
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For the next lemma, we introduce some handy notation. Let M∗v = Mv \⋃
w<vMw.
Lemma 53. There is a Σ1-formula ϕbirth(x, y) in the language of set theory,
using the coded model (K,≤, f, t) and the essential ordinal γ as parameters, such
that K(M), v  ϕbirth(x, y) if and only if y ∈ K such that y ≤ v and x ∈ M∗y.
Proof. Let ϕbirth(x, y) be defined as follows:
ϕbirth(x, y) ≡ y ∈ K ∧ ϕexists(x, y) ∧ ∀u ∈ K(u < y → ¬ϕexists(x, u)).
If w ≤ v and x ∈ M∗w, then it follows from the previous lemma that for all
u < w, K(M) 6 ϕexists(x, u), i.e., K(M)  ¬ϕexists(x, u). On the other hand,
we clearly have v  ϕexists(x,w) and hence v  ϕbirth(x,w).
Conversely, if v  ϕbirth(x,w) for w ≤ v, it follows that x ∈ Mw but x /∈ Mu
for u < w. Hence, x ∈M∗w.
Lemma 54. There is a Σ1-formula ϕpassed(x) in the language of set theory, us-
ing the coded model (K,≤, f, t) as a parameter, such that K(M), v  ϕpassed(x)
if and only if x ∈ K such that x ≤ v.
Proof. Consider the following formula:
ϕpassed(x) ≡ ψf(x)
The lemma now follows directly from the definition of the mimic model K(M).
We have now finished our preparations and can prove the following lemma
which will show that the mimic model can imitate the predication of the coded
model. This is a crucial step for connecting truth in the mimic model with truth
in the coded model.
Given x ∈Mv, let vx ∈ K be the unique node with x ∈ D∗vx and rx ∈ ω such
that rank(x) = λ+ rx for some limit ordinal λ. Define a map gv :Mv → Dv by
gv(x) = fvx(rx). Further let p·q : LIQC → ω be a fixed Gödel coding function.
Lemma 55. Let P be an n-ary predicate. There is a Σ1-formula ϕP (x¯) with
parameters only x0, . . . , xn−1 in the language of set theory such that K(M), v 
ϕP (x0, . . . , xn−1) if and only if (K,≤, D, V ), v  P (gv(x0), . . . , gv(xn−1)).
Proof. Let ϕP (x0, . . . , xn) be the following formula:
∃K,≤, f, t, r¯, u¯, w, γ(ϕess(γ) ∧ ϕorig(K,≤, f, t)
∧
∧
i<n
(∃λ(“λ limit ordinal” ∧ ri ∈ ω ∧ rank(xi) = λ+ ri))
∧
∧
i<n
ϕbirth(xi, ui) ∧ ϕpassed(w)
∧
∧
i<n
w ≥ ui
∧ ((r0, u0), . . . , (rn−1, un−1)) ∈ t(w, pPq)).
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Unfolding the formula by using the sequence of lemmas proved above, we see
that K(M), v  ϕP (x0, . . . , xn) is equivalent to the existence of some w ≤ v
such that there are ui ≤ w with xi ∈M∗ui , ri ∈ ω such that rank(xi) = λi+ri for
some limit ordinals λ and ((r0, u0), . . . , (rn−1, un−1)) ∈ t(w, pPq). By definition
of t, this is equivalent to (K,≤, D, V ), w  P (fu0(x0), . . . , fun−1(xn−1)), and
hence (K,≤, D, V ), w  P (gv(x0), . . . , gv(xn−1)) by definition of gv. Persistency
implies (K,≤, D, V ), v  P (gv(x0), . . . , gv(xn−1)).
Conversely, if (K,≤, D, V ), v  P (gv(x0), . . . , gv(xn)), then by definition of
gv, (K,≤, D, V ), v  P (fvx0 (r0), . . . , fvxn (rn)), where ri ∈ ω are as above. By
definition of t, we will have that:
((r0, vx0), . . . , (rn−1, vxn−1))
=((f−1vx0 (fvx0 (r0)), vx0), . . . , (f
−1
vxn
(fvxn−1 (rn−1), vxn−1)) ∈ t(v, pPq)
It follows that K(M), v  ϕP (x0, . . . , xn−1).
Define a first-order translation τ : LIQC → L∈ by stipulating that P (x¯)τ =
ϕP (x¯). Note that the range of τ consists of Σ1-formulas. We can now extend
the correspondence to all first-order formulas.
Lemma 56. Let K(M) be a mimic model of a well-founded rooted Kripke model
(K,≤, D, V ) for IQC. For every formula ϕ in the language of first-order logic,
we have that K(M), v  ϕ(x¯)τ if and only if (K,≤, D, V ), v  ϕ(gv(x¯)).
Proof. This is proved by an induction on the complexity of ϕ for all v ∈ K. The
atomic cases has been taken care of in Lemma 55 and the cases for the logical
connectives ∨, ∧ and → follow trivially. We will now prove the cases for the
quantifiers.
First observe that the maps defined by gv are surjective. This is due to the
fact that M∗v contains elements of rank λ+ n for any n < ω.
6
For the existential quantifier, assume that K(M), v  (∃xϕ(x, z¯))τ . This
is equivalent to the existence of some x ∈ Mv such that K(M), v  ϕτ (x, z¯).
By induction hypothesis, this is equivalent to the existence of some x ∈ Mv
such that (K,≤, D, V ), v  ϕ(gv(x), gv(z¯))). By the fact that gv is surjective,
we know that the latter is equivalent to (K,≤, D, V ), v  ∃xϕ(x, gv(z¯)).
For the universal quantifier, observe that K(M), v  (∀xϕ(x, z¯)))τ is equiv-
alent to the fact that for all x ∈ Mv it holds that K(M), v  ϕτ (x, gv(z¯)).
By induction hypothesis this holds if and only if for all x ∈ Mv we have
(K,≤, D, V ), v  ϕ(gv(x), gv(z¯)). Again, by using the surjectivity of gv, this
is equivalent to (K,≤, D, V ), v  ∀xϕ(x, gv(z¯)).
We are now ready to derive the final result.
6This can be shown via a construction starting with the generic x0 := G ∈ M∗v and
iterating the operation xn1 := {xn}. Then take y0 =
⋃
n<ω
xn and yn+1 := {yn}. It follows
that yn has rank λ+ n for some limit ordinal λ.
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Theorem 57. Let T ⊆ IKP+ + MP + AC be a set theory. If J ∈ Lα is an
intermediate first-order logic that is ZFC-provably Kripke-complete with respect
to a class of well-founded frames, then QLΣ1 (T (J)) = J .
Proof. Let J ∈ Lα be ZFC-provably Kripke-complete first-order logic. It is
clear that J ⊆ QL(T (J)). For the other direction, assume that J 6⊢ ϕ. By
our assumptions, there is a Kripke model (K,≤, D, V ) ∈ Lα such that (K,≤
, D, V ) 6 ϕ. Due to Lemma 6 we can assume without loss of generality that
(K,≤, D, V ) has countably increasing domains. Let K(M) be a mimic model
obtained from (K,≤, D, V ). By Lemma 56 it follows that K(M), v 6 ϕτ . As
K(M) is a model of IKP+ and T ⊆ IKP+, it follows that IKP+ 6⊢ ϕτ so that
ϕ /∈ QL(IKP+). This finishes the proof of the theorem.
We conclude this section by stating some important corollaries.
Corollary 58. Let T ⊆ IKP+ + MP + AC be a set theory. If J ∈ Lα is an
intermediate first-order logic that is ZFC-provably Kripke-complete with respect
to a class of well-founded frames, then QL(T (J)) = J .
Proof. As in the proof of Corollary 45, we use the fact that every axiomatisable
first-order logic is contained in Lα. The result then follows with Theorem 57.
Corollary 59. Let T ⊆ IKP+ +MP+ AC be a set theory. The first-order logic
of T is IQC, i.e., QL(T ) = IQC. In particular, QL(IKP) = IQC.
Proof. This follows from the fact that IQC is ZFC-provably Kripke-complete
with respect to a class of well-founded frames (see the proof of [27, Theorem
8.17]), and applying the previous corollary.
Corollary 60. Let T ⊆ IKP++MP+AC be a set theory. Then QL(T (QHPk)) =
QHPk for k < ω.
Proof. This follows from the fact that QHPk is complete with respect to the
class of frames of depth at most k (see [13, Theorem 6.3.8]).
4.6. The First-Order Logic with Equality of IKP
Given the results in the previous section, a natural question would be whether
these results extend to logic with equality. In this section we show that that is
not the case.
Theorem 61. Let T be a set theory based on intuitionistic logic containing the
axioms of extensionality, empty set and pairing. Then the first-order logic with
equality of T , QL=(T ), is strictly stronger than IQC=, i.e., IQC= ( QL=(T ).
Proof. Let ϕ denote the following formula in the language of IQC=:
[∃x∃y∀z(z = x ∨ z = y)]→ [∃x∀z(z = x)].
Intuitively, ϕ formalises the statement “if there are at most two objects, then
there is at most one object.” Note that ϕσ = ϕ holds for any first-order equal-
ity translation σ into the language of set theory. By the principle of ex falso
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quodlibet it therefore suffices to show that the antecedent of ϕ is false in T . Let
us call this antecedent ψ.
We give an informal argument that can be easily transferred into a formal
proof in the theory T . By pairing and emptyset, we can obtain the sets 0 = ∅,
1 = {∅}, and 2 = {∅, {∅}}. Suppose ψ. Then, by transitivity of equality, we
know that 0 = 1 ∨ 0 = 2 ∨ 1 = 2 must hold. In each case, we can derive
falsum, ⊥, using extensionality and the empty set axiom. With ∨-elimination
and →-introduction, we conclude that ¬ψ holds.
This argument shows that ϕ ∈ QL=(T ). To finish the proof of the theorem,
it is enough to show that ϕ /∈ IQC=. This follows by completeness as follows.
Consider the Kripke model for IQC= that consists of one node with a domain
of two distinct points: the antecedent of ψ will be true in this model but the
consequent fails.
Corollary 62. The first-order logic with equality of any set theory T considered
in this paper, such as IKP, IKP+ + MP + AC, CZF and IZF, is stronger than
IQC
=.
We close this section with the following question.
Question 63. What is the first-order logic with equality QL=(IKP) of IKP?
5. Conclusions and Open Questions
We have seen that IKP is a very well-behaved theory from the logical point
of view—in fact, this applies to every subtheory of IKP++MP+AC. This result
is also conceptually important: Constructive set theories are usually formulated
on the basis of IQC in such a way that the set-theoretic axioms should not
strengthen the logic, ensuring intuitionistic reasoning. We have shown that IKP
indeed satisfies this requirement. Determining the first-order logic of CZF, and
thus ensuring that CZF is logically and conceptually well-behaved, is an open
problem.
Question 64. What is the first-order logic of CZF? Is it the case thatQL(CZF) =
IQC?
Due to the failure of exponentiation (see Section 3.3.2) it is clear that our
techniques above cannot directly be used to obtain the results of this article for
CZF. With the semantics for CZF that the authors are currently aware of, it
seems not possible to obtain mimic models for CZF.
The situation for IZF is slightly different as Friedman and Ščedrov (see The-
orem 34) showed that IQC ( QL(IZF) ( CQC. A challenging open problem
is to give a better description of the first-order logic of IZF.
Question 65. What is the first-order logic of IZF? For example, is it possible
to give an axiomatisation of QL(IZF) or a concrete class of Kripke models that
characterise QL(IZF)?
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A first step in this direction might be to determine the relative first-order
logic of IZF.
Moreover, our study also contributes to the analysis of the admissible rules
of the theory IKP: Knowing the logic of a theory is the first step in analysing its
admissible rules. For example, as we have shown that L(IKP) = IPC, it follows
that any propositional rule that is admissible in IKP must be admissible in IPC
as well. It remains to determine the lower bound.
Question 66. What are the admissible rules of IKP?
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